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THE UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT: REFLECTIONS PAST
AND PRESENT*
WILLIAm

J.

BRENNAN, JR**

It is a pleasure indeed to participate in this your annual reunion.
It's the greater pleasure because of the opportunity it affords me to
see again some old friends of your distinguished state and federal
judiciaries. Chief justice Currie and justices Fairchild, Hallows, Gordon, and I have been students together at the appellate judges seminars
at New York University. I, too, of course have had the honor of service
in state courts including my own state's supreme court. And I am now
well through my ninth term in Washington. My own personal reaction
upon moving from Trenton to Washington was one of considerable
astonishment at learning how different the work of the two courts
really is. The work of each has a character, a difficulty, and a complexity of its own, and none of these has its exact counterpart in the
other. But I was not alone in discovering that my state court experience hardly prepared me for what was to come. When Justice Holmes
came to the Court from the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
he wrote Pollock that he found it to be "an adventure into the unknown," and when Justice Cardozo came from the New York Court
of Appeals, he said: "Whether the new field of usefulness is greater,
I don't know. Perhaps the larger opportunity was where I have been."
But I don't think this gracious annual event is the occasion for too
solemn a discourse. So tonight I'll not attempt anything very serious
but only look through the binoculars of history at some sidelights of
the Court.
For example, not every appointee to the Court has prized the honor
above all else. John Quincy Adams was nominated to the Court and
confirmed while on a delicate diplomatic mission to Russia. He rejected the appointment out of hand-apparently thinking it either an
insult or a devious way of bringing him home-and returned to haggling
with the Czar. So you see there is nothing new-from our beginnings
getting tough with Russian dictators has been a good way to get to the
*A speech delivered at the Marquette University Law Banquet, February 25,
1965.
** Associate justice, Supreme Court of the United States.
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White House. All in all, there have been twenty-four nominees to the
Court who for one reason or another did not sit. Roscoe Conkling, for
one, found New York politics more attractive and declined the office
after his nomination was confirmed in 1882. Stanton, Lincoln's Secretary of War, was nominated and confirmed in 1869 but died four days
later. Perhaps the most curious case was that of the last chancellor of
New York during the 1840's. It's often said the presence of a particular
person or personality at a certain time in history has brought about
important judicial reforms. The story of the chancellor who would be
a Justice is a case in point. He was twice nominated by President Tyler
but both times rejected by the Senate. His rejection was puzzling at
first because every prominent leader of the New York bar had strongly
endorsed the nomination. But the reason at length came to light. One
of the prominent New York lawyers wrote his senator urging the confirmation. He told the senator that all of the New York bar "are anxious
to get rid of a querulous, disagreeable, unpopular Chancellor." Though
the man was mild enough in private, on the bench he was highly unconventional and frequently harassed counsel with pointed interrogation
and biting sarcasm. Having failed to elevate him out of the state, the
New York bar resorted in desperation to a more drastic remedy. They
induced the New York legislature to abolish the position of chancellor,
thus, you see, achieving a notable judicial reform for quite unjudicial
purposes.
Of course, you know, I'm sure, that there have been Justices who
found other pastures greener after taking their seats. The first Chief
Justice, John Jay, was absent in Great Britain as Washington's special
envoy when he was elected Governor of New York. This opportunity
so pleased him that upon his return he promptly resigned as Chief Justice. His colleague, Associate Justice Rutledge, had quit earlier for what
seemed to him the more desirable post of chief justice of South Carolina. Rutledge was given a recess appointment as Jay's successor as
Chief Justice of the United States but, when the Senate convened, it
rejected his nomination within minutes after its submission. From that
episode aroses a conundrum: Is Earl Warren the thirteenth or the
fourteenth Chief Justice? I have heard it said that Chief Justice Vinson
believed that Rutledge was not in the line of Chief Justices and that he,
Vinson, was therefore the twelfth Chief Justice. The present Chief
Justice believes that Rutledge was in the line of Chief Justices and that
he, Warren, is the fourteenth Chief Justice. At the John Marshall
celebration at William and Mary a few years ago, held after the decision in Brown v. Board of Education,' Chief Justice Warren was the
speaker and Virginia's state officials stayed away almost to a man. The
program for that event lists thirteen, not fourteen, Chief Justices.
1349 U.S. 294 (1955).
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Chief Justice Warren has wondered whether this was because William
and Mary doesn't recognize Rutledge's claim or because they don't
recognize his. Or perhaps, like the hotel that has no thirteenth floor,
there has just never been a thirteenth Chief Justice.
But to get back-did you know that President Monroe, after justice
William Johnson had sat several years on the Court, offered Johnson,
by way of reward for conspicuous service, the lucrative position of
customs collector in any major port of Johnson's choice? Did you
know, too, that one Justice saw nothing improper in remaining on the
Court while he waged a vigorous, although unsuccessful, campaign for
the governorship of New York against Martin Van Buren? At least
those Justices who ran for the Presidency-Justice Davis in 1877 and
Justice Hughes in 1916-resigned before campaigning.
The popular interest these days in everything the Court does is a
far cry from the almost complete disinterest shown in its beginnings.
Believe me there's a difference in the climate between Trenton and
Washington. The winds of criticism and controversy that swirl around
the Court in Washington are generally of a higher velocity than those
blowing in state capitals-and the temperature is hotter. But the Court's
beginnings hardly forecast what was to come. The Court truly had a
hard time getting under way. Its history began in New York in the
old Produce Mart, called the Exchange, at the corner of Broad and
Wall Streets. There the first Court shared quarters with the New York
legislature in a building also used at odd hours as an off-Broadway
theatre, an exhibition hall, a coffee house, and a market for cut-rate
imported goods. Indeed, I am not sure that the recently discarded
tradition of starting Court sessions at noon didn't have its origin then,
for the New York Assembly met in the morning and the Justices had
to bide their time until the distinguished legislators recessed for lunch.
Actually, though, it didn't make too much difference. First of all there
was trouble getting the whole Court to New York for that session.
One of the Justices never did show up. He doubled in brass as the
Chief Justice of the Maryland Court of Appeals and those duties detained him until after the end of the Supreme Court's first term. It is
said though that he duly submitted a voucher for his salary.
But then it was, of course, a Court without any business to do.
There might have been a few cases had anyone remembered earlier
to appoint a Clerk. Without a Clerk there was no one to issue a writ
of error or a subpoena, so no lawyer quite knew how to get a case before the Court. The legal business of most of that term was principally
the admission of attorneys to practice. And I must say that there are
mornings in our Court today when happily the number of admissions
reminds us that the emphasis of the Court's work has not completely
changed.
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Our housing, though, has changed indeed. The Marble Palace, if I
may borrow John Frank's somewhat irreverent phrase, is a long step
from the Produce Mart. And indeed a long step from the Court's housing for most of its first half century. Eventually the Government
moved from New York to Philadelphia, a "thoroughly dissipated metropolis," in the view of one Boston lawyer. When the Court left New
York, its claim to the use of the hall of the Exchange passed into the
hands of a budding young political group, the Society of Saint Tammany. While in Philadelphia, the Justices fared a bit better, thanks to
the generosity of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which made its
courtroom available for this purpose for several years. The Pennsylvania chief justice had a curious habit. He always wore his hat while
on the bench. But those were the uncomplicated days before Erie R.R.
v. Tomrpkins2 and John Jay apparently felt no obligation to follow the
local practice.
When the Government moved to the swamps of the Potomac its
energies were given entirely to finding a suitable home for the President and spacious halls for the Congress. Nobody, but absolutely nobody, thought about housing for the Court. Eventually, by diligent
pressures the Justices managed a Senate committee lounge in the
magnificent new Capitol. It was a room all of 24 by 30 feet, destined
in time to become the Clerk's file room. But in short the Senate dislodged the Court even from that modest room. It was given an old
library in the House Wing, but the library was not heated and the
bone-weary Justices doubtless with relief transferred their sessions to
a tavern, Long's Tavern in Carroll Row. They moved back to the Capitol when more suitable quarters became available and occupied space
which in time became the Law Library. However, they were forced
again to go to a tavern, this time Bell's Tavern, when the British burned
the Capitol. With a genius for understatement the senator from New
Hampshire wrote the senator from New York that this second tavern
was "uncomfortable and unfit for the purpose for which it was used.
It was the house of Bailey, a reformed gambler from Virginia, who
has taken and fitted it up for a tavern." Eventually the old Senate
Chamber was converted into the fine courtroom occupied by the Court
for so many years until the completion of our magnificent building in
1935.
There was a time when people used to refer to "the color line of
the court"--though I hasten to say the reference had nothing to do
with segregation. The mention was of the time when Justices Gray,
Brown, and White sat in a row. These three Justices were long retired when that expression gave rise to an atrocious pun. At a dinner
party attended by Chief Justice Hughes mention was made of the
2304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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color line and that those who had made it up no longer sat on the Court.
This provoked from some wag, the awful pun: "Of course not, the
Court is all Hughes now."
A few weeks ago I had a visit from a candidate for a master's
degree who was writing a paper on the reaction of the Supreme Court
to public disapproval of certain decisions. He said that he was not having much success in finding helpful, or any, materials on that subject
and thought he'd like to inquire directly of Justices whose opinions
for the Court were sometimes greeted with more disdain than acclaim.
I don't know why I should have been the one he chose to speak to
first, but there it is. I couldn't help him very much.
Almost every decision is disapproved by somebody. The American
habit of framing controversial political, social, and economic problems
as law suits for ultimate decision by the Court must inevitably mean
that our resolution of the controversy must always disappoint proponents of the losing side. Indeed, I think that in the nature of things
we should be uneasy only when there is no criticism. Certainly the profession would not be discharging its responsibility if it failed vigorously,
though I hope objectively, to voice felt criticism of the Court's work.
All of us are regular readers of law reviews because of the help we get
from the painstaking, thoughtful, critical writing they often provide.
Even the best of criticism-which is often the best precisely because it
is the most telling and the most pungent-sometimes disturbs me. But
if I need solace when that happens, I can always go back and read that
delightfully extravagant sentence in the letter to the editor of Look
Magazine: "Justice Brennan appears to be the only American in high
government with whom I cannot find one iota of fault."
But, I repeat, our American tradition of framing as law suits social,
political, and economic problems which disturb and divide our society
must inevitably produce decisions upon which all will not agree. The
disappointed will, and should, express their dissatisfaction as they see
it. But, happily, not all go about it in the way one disappointed citizen
told justice Field what he thought of an opinion he had written for
the Court. One day a harmless looking box addressed to the Justice
arrived at the Court. Somehow the Justice's suspicions were aroused
and he had his law clerk take the box outside the building with instructions to open it after dousing it in water. Evidently law clerks did more
than legal research in those days. Sure enough, when the box was
opened it was found to contain a potent homemade explosive. And
affixed inside the lid where it would surely have been seen just before
the explosive went off was a copy of justice Field's opinion.
Many people ask whether the Court's workload is growing unmanageable. Well, I am in my ninth term of the Court. In my first term
the docket was some 2,050 cases. Last term the docket was 2,770 cases,

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48

an increase of some 36 per cent. So it has been said it's only reasonable
to conclude that the Court is overworked and can't give adequate consideration to the decision even of the 150-odd cases we decide by written opinion after argument. For while the docket is more crowded, the
percentage of cases taken has remained fairly constant, in the neighborhood of 7 per cent. While the conclusion that we are over-burdened
may seem to follow as a matter of mathematics, I say with all respect
that those who draw that conclusion are not fully informed about the
Court and the way it must function. Justice Douglas has answered this
argument at length and I could add little to what he has already said
on the question.
What I would like to consider for a moment though is a question
which has not had much attention from those who think we are overburdened. That is the question of what might be done even if it were
perfectly clear that the size of our docket is a problem. What are the
remedies? I have grave doubt whether increasing the size of the Court
would be an answer. At the very least an increase in the membership
would substitute new problems for old ones and perhaps aggravate
rather than relieve the problem. For a Court which may not sit in panels,
nine seems to me to be about the maximum number. I have also sat on
three- and seven-judge appellate courts and have learned that size can
affect administration. I -think that nine is probably just about right.
Perhaps, it has been suggested, we should take fewer cases for plenary
consideration each term. But, as it is, we take no more cases now than
did our predecessors in the twenties; indeed, in most years, the number
in which certiorari is granted or jurisdiction noted tends to be smaller
than thirty or forty years ago-and in consequence the length of each
full opinion tends to be somewhat greater. In addition, there are certain
areas in which the protection of vital federal interests demands that
we take a certain number of cases each year, even though our docket
may sometimes seem to be overbalanced in particular areas. For us
to avoid these areas just because we cannot always fashion new principles of law or resolve important new federal questions would, it
seems to me, be hiding our heads in the sands of irresponsibility. So
that is not the answer.
Indeed, it does seem to me that whatever answer there can be to
whatever problem exists-and I do not think this is a source of very
great concern-lies in the controlled and thoughtful use of our discretionary review by way of certiorari. The answer is not in having
more Justices, or granting more petitions, or writing shorter opinions,
but in picking among the thousands of cases which are brought to us
each year in order to distill from the mass the purest essence of judicial
problems which cry out for decision. That is precisely what we are
trying to do. And if there is a problem, it seems to me chiefly to be
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that our judgment as to the worth of each case, as it is presented on
petition for certiorari or appeal in often sketchy and inadequate form,
is not always perfect. Even the judgment of hindsight is not perfect,
and we are always handicapped by the exigencies of foresight.
As things stand, the expanded use of the summary calendar, that
is, the calendar allowing only one-half hour to each side for oral argument, has proved very helpful. Indeed, over 60 per cent of the argued
cases for this term are on the summary calendar. Written opinions in
about one-third of the cases are handed down in about five weeks and
another third within ten weeks and the rest in from ten to thirty weeks.
But I also think that there are other remedies for shrinking the calendar that we might consider. Surely one candidate for revision is the
statute governing direct appeal from the district courts. Our American
tradition has always been that a losing litigant should have at least one
appeal of right to some court. But antitrust cases, particularly those
tried before a single judge, appealable under the Expediting Act 3 directly to us often require consideration of very extensive records. Trials of
six months, nine months, or even a year in such cases are becoming increasingly the rule rather than the exception. It was not contemplated
that our Court would ordinarily review fact findings. But cases of this
kind often require that kind of review at least as a preliminary to the
legal issues. This function could more properly and perhaps be better
done by the court of appeals. Even if the number of such cases is small,
the time required for their consideration is disproportionately large. The
routing of such cases through the court of appeals seems not only appropriate but indeed necessary.
Measurable relief in another area may be more difficult. There has
been an enormous increase in seven years in applications of both state
and federal prisoners claiming that their convictions were obtained in
violation of federally secured rights. It is not only that the applications themselves are often difficult to follow or decipher-most of
them, of course, are prepared without assistance of counsel. The more
serious difficulty arises from the fact that the courts below, particularly
state courts, have disposed of the matters without opinions or any
indication of the basis for the disposition. If it's a state case, we are
thus unable to know whether the decision rests squarely on a determination of the federal claim, or wholly or partly on an adequate state
ground. In consequence, we often have no alternative but to take what
may prove on argument to be a wholly unfounded application or send
it to federal habeas corpus. I think not only that our burden would be
eased but the values of federalism be much better served if state
courts would be less preoccupied with insubstantial procedural defaults, and come to grips with these federal constitutional claims, hold
3

32 Stat. 823 (1903), 15 U.S.C. §29 (1958).
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hearings, and dispose of them on the merits. If that happened, many
of these cases would never come to us and such as did we'd be able more
promptly to decide. Perhaps our recent decisions in Fay v. Noi and
5
Townsend v. Saim
will give some impetus to the states to inaugurate
such reforms.
Sometimes-especially around this time of year when our workload is heaviest-I think a bit enviously about those four Justices who
sat through the spring of 1790 waiting for the cases that never came.
Theirs was a vital, if easy, task, serving appropriately the needs of
a new nation. We could not, even if we wanted to, be the Court of the
1790's or even of the 1920's. The pace at which the courts of the United
States move today, and the amount of business they handle every year,
are simply responsive to the radically different social, political, and
economic demands of the 1960's. And the Court has changed no less than
the other branches of Government. Yet, for all that the institution,
its prestige, and its work have changed, something of the spirit of
Marshall and Story and Taney, of Holmes and Brandeis and Hughes,
is very much with us and will remain with our successors. Men come
and go, principles of law alter and develop, but the essence of an
institution survives intact.

4 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
5 372 U.S. 293 (1963).

